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The Swinging Pendulum: The Supreme Court Reverses
Course on ERISA and Managed Care
Aaron S. Kesselheim, M.D.,J.D.* and Troyen A. Brennan, M.D.,
J.D., M.P.H.t
INTRODUCTION
The critical issue in health policy is the cost of health care, and its
importance will only rise further with the changing demographics of the
U.S. population. The last twenty years have seen numerous efforts to
control costs, beginning with regulatory mechanisms' and later dominated
by the market-based approach of managed care. At its peak, managed care
led to a historic decrease in the rate of inflation in health care costs.3 Over
the last five years, however, managed care has retreated significantly in
favor of consumer-driven health care, in which individual patients are
more exposed to the costs of care and thus choose more carefully which
services to purchase.4
Federal and state regulation, as well as common law litigation, helped
hasten the abandonment of managed care and the subsequent embrace of
consumer-driven health care.5 In the 1980s and early 1990s, as a result of
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1. See TROYEN A. BRENNAN & DONALD M. BERWICK, NEW RULES: REGULATION, MARKETS,
AND THE QUALITY OF AMERICAN HEALTH CARE (1996).
2. SeeJAMES C. ROBINSON, THE CORPORATE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE (1999).
3. See Katharine Levit et al., Health Spending in 1998: Signals of Change, 19 HEALTH AFF.
124 (2000).
4. SeeJames C. Robinson, Reinvention of Health Insurance in the Consumer Era, 291 JAMA
1880 (2004).
5. See M. Gregg Bloche & David M. Studdert, A Quiet Revolution: Law as an Agent of
Health System Change, 23 HEALTH AFF. 29 (2004).
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the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),6 insurance
companies designed managed care strategies without significant state
supervision.7 ERISA established national standards for employer-sponsored
benefit plans, rendering certain state laws inapplicable for enrollees in
employer-sponsored health plans and limiting their ability to sue their
managed care companies. As consumer dissatisfaction with elements of
managed care grew, however, federal courts found themselves under
increasing pressure to restrict this pre-emptive effect and allow more
effective oversight of managed care tactics.
Starting in 1995, and fueled by three decisions since 2000, the
Supreme Court has helped spur a judicial movement to limit the
boundaries of ERISA preemption. The Court seemingly acceded to
popular concern about the role that courts' support for ERISA preemption
had originally played in the growth of managed care. This retreat
weakened managed care, as executives and shareholders of managed care
companies grew concerned about the costs of litigation and complying
with state regulation, and the publicity gave further voice to the opposition
to managed care practices.8 Experts agreed, "[T]he free ride enjoyed by
health maintenance organizations is now over."9
Thus it is an extraordinary surprise that in its recent decision in Aetna
Health v. Davila,'° which involved a state statute intended to protect
managed care enrollees, the Supreme Court reversed course and
reiterated its pre-1995 broad ERISA preemption doctrine. Few, if any,
health law experts anticipated this event." In the wake of this reversal for
consumer and physician interests, we reexamine the development of
ERISA law prior to Davila and present a vision of the immediate
implications of the decision. We conclude by suggesting that Davila may
represent the first swing of the pendulum back toward managed care.
A REVIEW OF MANAGED CARE LITIGATION AND REGULATION
Much has been written about the development of managed care in this
country. 12 Briefly put, due to the benefits of the Health Maintenance
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).
7. See Wendy K. Mariner, What Recourse?-Liability for Managed-Care Decisions and the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 343 NEw ENG.J. MED. 592 (2000).
8. SeeJames C. Robinson, The End of Managed Care, 285 JAMA 2622 (2001).
9. Marc I. Machiz, Hidden Blow to HMOs, NAT'L L.J.,July 3, 2000, at Al9.
10. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004).
11. See Bloche & Studdert, supra note 5, at 35.
12. See, e.g., WALTER A. ZELMAN & ROBERT A. BERENSON, THE MANAGED CARE BLUES AND
V:I1 (2005)
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Organization (HMO) Act of 1973, nascent managed care organizations
(MCOs) gained a competitive advantage over traditional insurers in terms
of the premiums that they could offer to employers. HMOs, particularly
those that employed medical staff and emphasized the use of guidelines to
dictate care delivery, controlled physician decision-making by inducing
compliance with algorithms designed to provide the most cost-effective
care.
Seeing reduced expenditures, traditional insurers organized their own
managed care plans, relying on tighter networks of physicians who agreed
to managed care techniques-such as prospective utilization review,
primary care gate-keeping, and relatively careful prior approval. 4 Though
the Clinton Health Plan was rejected by Congress, some of its principles
still diffused out into the marketplace. As a result, even the hospital
industry began to reorganize along the lines of primary care gate-keeping
and prospective capitated payment. In many metropolitan areas, hospital
utilization and ancillary testing were reduced, and health care inflation
slowed to historically low levels. 15
Patients and their advocates, however, began to recognize that many
managed care organizational structures reversed the financial incentives in
the doctor-patient relationship. In indemnity care, the physicians increased
income by providing more care; in managed care, physicians' profit motive
was no longer aligned with elaboration of services, and patients began to
worry whether that could lead to restrictions on needed care. 6 Patient
advocates appealed to state legislatures to help regulate MCOs," and
patients brought increasingly potent suits alleging harm by MCOs for
denying them appropriate benefits.' But these efforts, which challenged
care reduction techniques at the heart of managed care, often bumped up
against the ERISA preemption doctrine. 9
How To CuRE THEM (1998).
13. Federal HMO Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-222, 87 Stat. 914.
14. Robinson, supra note 8, at 2624.
15. Levit et al., supra note 3, at 124.
16. SeeJon Gabel, Ten Ways HMOs Have Changed During the 1990s, 16 HEALTH AFF. 134
(1997).
17. See Stephen R. Latham, Regulation of Managed Care Incentive Payments to Physicians, 22
AM.J.L. & MED. 399 (1996).
18. Jones v. Chicago HMO Ltd. of Ill., 730 N.E.2d 1119 (Ill. 2000); Petrovich v. Share
Health Plan, 719 N.E.2d 756 (Ill. 1999).
19. See Alice A. Noble & Troyen A. Brennan, Managing Care in the New Era of "Systems-
Think ": The Implications for Managed Care Organizational Liability and Safety, 29 J.L. MED. &
ETHICs 290 (2001).
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ERISA AND MANAGED CARE ORGANIZATIONS
ERISA sets a national administrative standard for employer-sponsored
pension and benefit plans, making them more palatable for large
employers who would otherwise be subject to fifty different state regulatory
schemes. The law also establishes a national remedy for failure to provide
ERISA-sponsored benefits, limiting damages to the costs of the denied
benefit and attorneys' fees. ERISA removes employer-sponsored plans from
the control of any state law that "relates to" the management of plan
benefits. 20 The ERISA "savings clause" allowed legislation that regulates the
general business of insurance to stand,2' but it was interpreted narrowly in
early decisions and does not apply to regulation specifically directed at
MCOs. 22 Although ERISA does not establish a uniform standard for all
health plan administration, it impacts the large number of consumers who
obtain health insurance through their employers.23
This design has had two significant results. First, state laws did not
apply to some important business practices of MCOs. 24 A state, for
example, that required plans to cover annual mammograms for women at
a certain age could only apply to government-sponsored or individually-
purchased health plans. Second, even if plans inappropriately delayed
claims or denied coverage for a treatment, enrollees could not sue under
their state's common law of negligence, thus denying them consequential
damages, punitive damages, or compensation for emotional distress.25
Instead, such enrollees could receive only the ERISA remedy. When a
patient sued her health plan for negligently denying approval for an
autologous bone marrow transplant and high-dose chemotherapy in
treating her breast cancer, she won an $89 million damage award in state
court.2" Her plan was state-sponsored; if she had been in an employer-
sponsored benefit plan, her award would have been limited in federal
court to the cost of the procedure and attorneys' fees. This so-called
regulatory vacuum"27 likely contributed to the excesses of managed care
20. See29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000).
21. See id. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
22. See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
23. Peter D. Jacobson & Scott D. Pomfret, ERISA Litigation and Physician Autonomy, 283
JAMA 921 (2000).
24. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990).
25. See Corcoran v. United Healthcare, 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
26. David M. Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, The Problems with Punitive Damages in
Lawsuits Against Managed-Care Organizations, 342 NEw ENG.J. MED. 280 (2000).
27. Jacobson & Pomfret, supra note 23, at 921.
V:1 (2005)
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during that era, as MCOs made large profits exploiting physicians and
hospitals in negotiation tactics and limiting services to enrollees.28
As a result, in the 1990s, advocacy groups pushed the federal
government to amend ERISA to bring it in line with the modern reality of
the health care marketplace.29 While Congress did not reform ERISA, these
efforts found a receptive audience in state legislatures, where popular
opinion helped inspire legislators to try to rein in the well-publicized
excesses of managed care. States protected enrollees by mandating certain
inclusions in their health plans-for example, requiring certain benefits
30like mammograms, providing independent review quickly when coverage
was denied,1 and mandating prompt payment to physicians.2 Meanwhile,
aggrieved enrollees looked to hold MCOs accountable for their business
practices by making claims, akin to common law negligence arguments,
that MCOs were liable for the injury-causing decisions of providers under
their control. But as originally interpreted, ERISA preemption made these
legislative and judicial efforts moot for many MCO enrollees.
A NEW PREEMPTION ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court's early comments on ERISA preemption solidified
a long-standing broad judicial interpretation of the "relates to" clause.33 In
two 1987 cases, the Supreme Court called ERISA "a comprehensive civil
enforcement scheme" and seemed to favor arming ERISA with
"extraordinary pre-emptive power.,' 35 In the 1990s, however, as MCOs
expanded their influence over the health care system-and their profits-
28. See Wendy K. Mariner, State Regulation of Managed Care and the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act, 335 NEW ENG.J. MED. 1986 (1996).
29. Cf Bipartisan Patient Protection Act, S.1052, 107th Cong. (2001).
30. See Vicki L. MacDougall, Medical Gender Bias and Managed Care, 71 OKLA. CITY U. L.
REV. 781 (2002).
31. See Aaron S. Kesselheim, What's the Appeal? Trying To Control Managed Care Medical
Necessity Decision Making Through a System of External Appeals, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 873 (2001).
32. See Healthcare Fin. Mgmt. Ass'n, State Prompt Payment Laws At-a-Glance, at
http://www.hfma.org/resource/focus-areas/commercial-payment/promptpay.htm (last
visited July 1, 2004); Conomikes, Summary of State Prompt Payment Laws,
http://www.conomikes.com/PromptPay.htm (last visited Dec. 5, 2004).
33. SeeJana K. Strain & Eleanor D. Kinney, The Road Paved with Good Intentions: Problems
and Potential for Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance Under ERISA, 31 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 29
(1999).
34. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987).
35. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65 (1987).
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the Supreme Court moved to limit the scope of preemption using three
different legal avenues.
First, in New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers, the Supreme Court re-examined the "relates to" clause in the
context of a New York state statute that imposed extra surcharges on
patients covered by commercial insurers or HMOs.m A group of
commercial health insurers sued to have the statute invalidated, and the
lower federal courts agreed that ERISA preempted this state law that
affected employee benefit plans by increasing their costs of doing business.
On appeal, however, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the statute
because the impact of the rate-setting law was remote. Justice Souter
concluded, "If 'relate to' were taken to extend to the furthest stretch of its
indeterminacy, then for all practical purposes preemption would never run
its course."37 He placed the first restriction on ERISA's reach by limiting the
scope of the "relates to" section, and in doing so prevented ERISA
preemption from undermining a state law designed to reduce health care
costs and improve access.
More generally, the Court seemed to change its attitude toward ERISA.
Justice Souter confronted the broad path that preemption was carving in
health care, remarking that nothing in ERISA indicated "that Congress
chose to displace general health care regulation, which is traditionally a
matter of local concern."' The opinion implied that ERISA would not
completely block reform efforts.
The Court demonstrated an awareness of its role, mediated by ERISA,
in changing health policy. As a result, some statutes and cases once
considered preempted under the broad reading of ERISA now found
receptive lower courts. In Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, for example, the plaintiff
sued his MCO for not taking reasonable care in selecting and monitoring
its physicians. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that ERISA did
not preempt his claim, since it did not involve withheld or delayed
benefits.39 The Fifth4° and Eleventh 41 Circuit Courts also found instances
where ERISA did not preempt suits against MCOs for negligence.
The Dukes distinction predicted the second technique the Supreme
36. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2807-c (McKinney 2002).
37. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers, 514 U.S. 645,
655 (1995).
38. Id. at 661.
39. Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995).
40. Roark v. Humana, 307 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 2002).
41. Land v. Cigna Healthcare of Fla., 339 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2003).
V:I1 (2005)
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Court employed to limit ERISA-redefining MCO decision-making. In
Pegram v. Herdrich,42 Dr. Lori Pegram, an employee of the physician-owned
Carle HMO, found a mass in Cynthia Herdrich's abdomen. Instead of
sending her to a local hospital at increased cost to Carle, Dr. Pegram
recommended that Herdrich wait eight days for an ultrasound by
colleagues within Carle's system. Herdrich's appendix ruptured. In her
lawsuit, she charged that Carle failed its fiduciary function by directly
influencing its physicians' decisions about medical treatment in such a way
that caused her harm. It was a novel effort to find employer-sponsored
health plans liable for their coverage decisions within the confines of
ERISA, which requires its plans to act as fiduciaries in the best interest of
their participants.
However, the Supreme Court refused to extend such a fiduciary duty
to eligibility determinations. In a unanimous decision, Justice Souter
distinguished between two major forms of health care decision-making-
eligibility decisions made by health plan administrators to determine what
services the plan might cover and treatment decisions made by providers
regarding how to diagnose and manage patients' conditions. Justice Souter
called Pegram's decision a "mixed eligibility and treatment decision,
43
where the question was not whether the ultrasound was covered, but
whether the service was appropriate to use at that particular time. MCOs
could not be held liable as a fiduciary, because that would strike at the very
basis of managed care itself and "no HMO organization could survive
without some incentive connecting physician reward with treatment
rationing."
44
Despite dismissing the fiduciary claim, Justice Souter restricted MCOs'
ERISA shield by separating the eligibility decisions from the mixed
eligibility and treatment decisions. Whereas ERISA preemption clearly
covers eligibility determinations, mixed decisions are not part of a health
plan's administrative function. As a result, if MCOs or their agents make
such mixed decisions, then it might be possible to hold them liable for
negligence in doing so. Since Justice Souter did not set a clear distinction
between eligibility and mixed decisions, it might be possible for MCOs'
efforts to influence member physicians' practices to fall outside ERISA
protection.
The Supreme Court again espoused a critical tone about MCOs in
general, as Justice Souter critiqued their role in health care delivery and
42. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
43. Id. at 229.
44. Id. at 220.
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encouraged further debate about the need to oversee decision-making in
the managed care system. 45 His dicta confirmed that the Court was
monitoring ERISA's effect on the evolution of the American health care
system and might now consider reexamining impediments previous
decisions had placed on reform efforts.4 The Supreme Court seemed to
join the anti-managed care fray.
In two decisions in 2002 and 2003, the Supreme Court revealed a third
approach to restricting the ERISA shield by expanding the "savings clause."
In the first case, Rush Prudential v. Moran, an Illinois statute provided MCO
enrollees the right to independent medical review if their MCO denied
benefits they felt were contractually owed.47 When Debra Moran had
persistent pain and numbness in her hand, she sought to have a special
procedure performed by a surgeon not associated with her HMO, Rush
Prudential. Rush Prudential told her that it would only cover a more
standard procedure performed by an affiliated physician. Moran sought
independent review, but Rush Prudential denied her request and
countered that the Illinois law that "relates to" administration of their
benefits was preempted and invalid.
In a narrow 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court sided with Moran. 48 Rush
Prudential lawyers argued that the independent review process was an
illegal alternative to ERISA's system. MCO enrollees could avoid suing for
the relatively meager ERISA statutory remedies by applying to a state-
organized external appeals process. But Justice Souter, again for the
majority, wrote that the "[e]ffect of eliminating insurer's autonomy to
guarantee terms congenial to its own interests is stuff of regular insurance
regulation" and therefore fell under ERISA's savings clause. He supported
states' ability to enforce standards of reasonable medical care in the
process of regulating insurance companies-as long as states do not come
in direct conflict with ERISA.
The scope of the savings clause arose again in the context of another
state law in Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans v. Miller.49 Most MCOs contract
with specific providers to establish selective networks that only members
can access. These contracts provide bargaining leverage for MCOs in
negotiations with other providers looking to join the network. Kentucky
passed a statute forbidding health insurers from discriminating against any
45. Id. at 221.
46. Id.
47. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 125/4-10 (1987).
48. Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002).
49. Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329 (2003).
V: 1 (2005)
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provider in a given coverage area who wanted to join the network and
could meet the standard MCO conditions for participation. 50 The Kentucky
Association of Health Plans claimed that ERISA preempted this so-called
"Any Willing Provider" law. 5'
In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Scalia, the Supreme
Court ruled that the state law fell under the ERISA savings clause. For a
general law that regulates insurance to be saved from ERISA preemption,
it only had to substantially affect the risk pooling arrangement, rather than
control the actual terms of insurance policies." Though by 2003 many
health plans had voluntarily stopped using selective provider networks to
drive cost savings,5 Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans relaxed the savings clause
requirements and left the door open for more state regulations to impact
other MCO management tactics.
By limiting the "relates to" clause, separating eligibility from mixed
decisions, and expanding the savings clause, these Supreme Court
decisions seemed consistent in narrowing ERISA's reach and expanding
state influence over employer-sponsored health plans. Finding no
legislative relief at the federal level, consumer activists and provider groups
continued to work for local regulatory reform. Had ERISA been
transformed from an "extraordinarily preemptive power"54 and given way
to allow MCOs to be subject to tort liability or state control? Many experts
believed so. Bloche and Studdert arguably spoke for the majority of health
policy analysts when they stated, "the Supreme Court has sounded an
ERISA 'all-clear' for state regulation of plans' management practices.,' 5 5 But
the Supreme Court had a surprise in store this past June.
A REVERSAL OF FORTUNE
Davila consolidated several cases that arose in Texas when enrollees in
employer-sponsored MCOs attributed their injuries to the decision-making
of their health plan administrators. After Ruby Calad underwent a
hysterectomy with a rectal, bladder, and vaginal repair, the utilization
review nurse for Cigna, Calad's health plan, arranged for her to be sent
50. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304.17A-270 (Michie Supp. 2003).
51. Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans, 538 U.S. at 332-33.
52. Id. at 338.
53. Tanya Albert, High Court Punches Another Hole in the Federal Law Shielding HMOs,
AMNEws, Apr. 21, 2003, at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2003/04/21/gvl
10421.htm.
54. Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 376 (2002).
55. Bloche & Studdert, supra note 5, at 35.
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home after a one-day hospital stay (contrary to the judgment of her
doctor). Calad claimed that her early discharge contributed to the
unspecified complications that arose a few days later and caused her to
have to return to the emergency room.56 In another case, Juan Davila
suffered from arthritis and was prescribed rofecoxib by his physician. His
Aetna HMO coverage required him to first try a less expensive non-
steroidal anti-inflammatory drug such as naproxen. After three weeks of
treatment with naproxen, he suffered severe gastrointestinal bleeding
requiring blood transfusions and a five-day stay in a hospital intensive care
unit.57
Both Davila and Calad sued under the 1997 Texas Health Care
Liability Act (THCLA), which requires MCOs to "exercise ordinary care
when making health care treatment decisions" and makes plans liable for
damages if they are negligent in meeting the ordinary care standard. 8 If
the plan did not cover the desired health care service, then no liability
could arise. The law thus sought to mirror the dichotomy between
eligibility and mixed treatment-eligibility decisions set in Pegram and
impose accountability accordingly. The plaintiffs claimed that their injuries
resulted from such mixed decisionmaking. In response, the health plan
lawyers invoked ERISA's preemption over their claims and recast the
claims in federal court to make the plaintiffs entitled, at most, to collecting
the benefits denied-in Davila's case, arguably the cost of a rofecoxib
prescription.59
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals gleaned a modem interpretation of
ERISA preemption as one preventing states from exactly duplicating the
terms of ERISA. Since ERISA provides a "means of collecting benefits,"
6
and THCLA provides a duty of reasonable care, the Fifth Circuit Court
reasoned that the Texas statute fell outside of ERISA. It was a reading of
ERISA so narrow as to make the statute completely toothless; no injured
MCO enrollees would use the ERISA scheme merely to collect benefits.
Rather, all would choose to sue for negligence and the resulting damages
under state law.61
The Supreme Court rejected this opportunity to remove ERISA from
the health care regulation equation. With the support of a unanimous
56. Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298, 302 (2002).
57. Id. at 303.
58. TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.001-.003 (Vernon Supp. 2003).
59. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488, 2498 (2004).
60. Id. at 2499.
61. Roark, 307 F.3d at 310.
V:I1 (2005)
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court, Justice Thomas found that the issue of exercising ordinary care
under THCLA was inextricably bound up in the administration of medical
services under health plan contracts, which was ERISA's regulatory
domain.6 2 Even though THCLA enforced a somewhat different duty than
ERISA, the same set of facts could invoke both state and federal law under
the Fifth Circuit's interpretation, so state law could be used to completely
supplant ERISA. This would go against "Congress' intent to make the
ERISA civil enforcement mechanism exclusive. 63
More significantly, Justice Thomas readdressed some prior Supreme
Court ERISA health law holdings to cast them in a new light. He quoted
liberally from the Supreme Court's 1987 cases, and once again classified
ERISA as a "comprehensive remedial scheme., 64 He also closed the door
that Pegram had opened with regard to mixed decisions. He considered the
plan administrators' actions with respect to Davila and Calad as pure
eligibility decisions, remarking that only a treating physician also acting as
the administrator of health plan coverage decisions can make mixed
65
eligibility-treatment decisions. His decision effectively placed plan
administrators' utilization review decisions back under the ERISA shield
for liability purposes.
Finally, he invoked an overpowering federal policy implicit in ERISA
to tighten the scope of the savings clause. He limited Rush Prudential to its
facts, implying that the decision did not support the principle that states
could freely formulate novel alternative forms of regulation outside of
ERISA, such as independent appeals processes, without fear of
66preemption. The dissent in Rush Prudential, also written by Justice
Thomas, rejected Illinois' independent appeals law, in part due to ERISA's
rejection of overlapping remedies. 6' A unanimous majority now directly
invoked a position formerly held by a four-person minority-a sign of how
critically the court may view other alternative remedies in the future.
Justice Thomas did not even cite Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans, perhaps
reflecting his view that, with the Court's new perspective on ERISA, that
case's reformulation of the savings clause was of minimal importance to
future ERISA jurisprudence. Texas, as well as the other states with similar
62. Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2497.
63. Id. at 2499.
64. Id. at 2500.
65. Id. at 2499.
66. Id.
67. Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 388 (2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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statutes,8 found this effort to hold MCOs accountable for negligent
coverage decisions to be invalid.
WHAT'S NEXT FOR ERISA HEALTH CARE LAW?
The language reinvigorating ERISA in Davila is hard to reconcile with
the previous trend of cases limiting the reach of preemption, unless we
impute to the Court an awareness of health policy. In Davila, the Supreme
Court may have finally reached the end of how far it could stretch ERISA.
More interesting, however, was the change in tone from previous
discussions in Pegram or Rush Prudential The Court retreated from
language in those decisions that seems to favor local health care regulation
over the business tactics MCOs use to administer care. Even Justice
Ginsburg's concurrence agreed that the decision is "consistent with our
governing case law," that "'virtually all state law remedies are preempted,"'
and that the Court's hands were tied by the federal ERISA law as currently
framed. 9 These words should strongly discourage future efforts to
reinterpret ERISA at the state legislative or judicial contexts, and we are
not likely to see another Davila-like case soon. Instead, patient advocates
will likely turn their efforts towards federal legislative reform of the ERISA
statute itself.
Our explanation for this swing is that the Supreme Court was
uncomfortable at the vanguard of the anti-managed care movement. As
discussed in the introduction, the Supreme Court, in its own decisions
since 1995 and the direction it therefore gave to lower courts, had helped
restrict managed care by limiting ERISA preemption. As increased
litigation gave voice to the public backlash, stockholders lost interest in
those insurers who persisted in capitated managed care. ° Managed care
collapsed, to be replaced, at least in the rhetoric of health policy, by
consumer-driven health care.
But consumer-driven health care has its own problems. First, the
theory of consumer choice relies on competitive markets, and there are
few signs that such market conditions are developing in the health care
68. At least ten other similar state statutes have been adopted. See, e.g., Managed Health
Care Insurance Accountability Act of 1999, 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. 536 (West); see also Anne
Gearan, High Court Hears Test of Patient Protection Laws, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 24, 2004,
at 4.
69. Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2503 (quoting DeFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442,
456 (3d Cir. 2003)).
70. See CHARLES BOORADY ET AL., HEALTHCARE SERVICES: MANAGED CARE (2000).
V:I1 (2005)
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sector."' Second, the central features of consumer choice are higher co-
payments and deductibles, which represent the thinning out of employer-
provided insurance. Reduction of employee benefits is a major theme in
the effort to make American companies more competitive,72 but this
creates problems with access to care and is only a short-term solution to
limiting costs. As a result, Robinson has warned that the consumer-driven
approach will not be sufficient to control costs and improve quality; some
aspects of managed care will have to be revived.7'
Perhaps then, in Davila, the Supreme Court was being appropriately
cautious in not allowing the Texas law to take a further step to cripple the
business model of managed care. More to the point, as Justice Ginsburg's
concurring opinion relates, the key guidance on health policy must come
from Congress, which has done little recently to address ERISA.4 Judicial
capacity to address such complex issues is limited,75 and the Supreme
Court's insistence in other cases that it must defer to administrative
expertise in health policy indicates that it recognizes this.
76
Our view of the Supreme Court, then, is that the Justices are more
aware of the role their decisions play in health policy than has previously
been appreciated, and their intent for now is not to be activist. The effort
to reverse course and halt the momentum of the attack on ERISA is
important evidence that the Supreme Court will not allow itself to be the
instrument of health care reform. That is a role it wants to defer to the
legislative branch, as the role of consumer choice, and the re-emergence of
managed care, define the policy battleground in the effort to reduce
health care costs.
71. Bloche & Studdert, supra note 5, at 39-40.
72. Micheline Maynard, United Appears Boxed in as Trouble Percolates, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1,
2004, at C1.
73. Robinson, supra note 4, at 1886.
74. See Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2503; Gail B. Agrawal & Mark A. Hall, Managed Care Liability
Beyond the ERISA Shield, 47 ST. Louis U. LJ. 235 (2003).
75. See Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, The Controversy over High-Dose
Chemotherapy with Autologous Bone Marrow Transplant for Breast Cancer, 20 HEALTH AFF. 101
(2001).
76. See Michelle M. Mello et al., The Pharmaceutical Industry Versus Medicaid-Limits on
State Initiatives To Control Prescription-Drug Costs, 350 NEW ENG.J. MED. 608 (2004).
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